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“You Have to Understand”: The Saga of Longfin
Corp. Reveals the Danger of Trading Halts
Imposed by Self-Regulating Exchanges
THOMAS DAVIS††
Late 2017 marked, perhaps, the peak of Bitcoin frenzy. A number of specious, if not outright
fraudulent issuers took advantage of this craze by publicly listing their stock while touting some
connection to blockchain technology. One of these issuers, Longfin Corp., exploded to a $6 billion
market cap despite being little more than an empty shell promoted by alleged fraudsters. Short
sellers who investigated Longfin were seemingly correct about the company being worthless, but
a lengthy trading halt instituted by Nasdaq caused many of these short sellers to suffer
considerable losses instead of cashing out on what would otherwise be hugely profitable short
positions. This Note proposes changes to the regulatory scheme that currently allows selfregulating exchanges like Nasdaq to issue such trading halts with almost no restrictions. The
recommended changes would further the principles of free and open markets and transparency
that are fundamental to the securities laws by preventing exchanges from arbitrarily halting trade
for extended periods of time.

† Recent graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Class of 2020; Articles
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. Thank you to Professors Jared Ellias and John Crawford for their feedback and
edits throughout the writing process. Further thanks to the many amateur traders, named and unnamed, whose
experiences form the basis of this Note.
† The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclaims responsibility for any private publication
or statement of any SEC employee or commissioner. This Note expresses the Author’s views and does not
necessarily reflect those of the commission, the commissioners, or other members of the staff. Lastly, this Note
was originally scheduled for publication in the fall of 2020 but was unavoidably delayed due to world events. In
the interim, Longfin was the subject of a flurry of legal developments; in particular, government enforcement
actions. These developments do not impact the argument presented in this Note and have been omitted to avoid
the inconvenience of resubmitting the Note to the SEC for review and approval.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether diligent or not, regulators can and do fail in preventing frauds and
scams from listing on public exchanges. This creates a ripe hunting ground for
short sellers (colloquially, investors or traders who bet against an asset),1 who
have a substantial monetary incentive to root out and expose these frauds—
picking up the investigatory slack where regulators come up short. Shorting a
company can take various forms, all of them fraught with risks. Some of these
risks are baked-in, unavoidable consequences of the financial instruments used
to short. Others stem from sensible protective measures put in place by
regulators to maintain market stability. These risks are generally wellestablished and accepted by those who choose to enter the world of short selling.
This Note explores another type of risk; one that exists only because of the
heavy-handed use of trading halts by self-regulating stock exchanges. The story
of Longfin Corp. clearly demonstrates the nature of this risk and why the
regulatory justifications for its existence do not hold up to scrutiny.
After debuting at $5 per share on the Nasdaq in December 2017, the stock
price of Longfin Corp. (NASDAQ: LFIN) fluctuated wildly during the handful
of months it was listed on the exchange, enjoying a multibillion-dollar market
cap for most of that time.2 The purported FinTech and cryptocurrency company
attracted considerable scrutiny from short sellers for several reasons, not least of
which being two interviews given live on CNBC by the company’s embattled
CEO Venkat Meenavalli.3 In those few months, the suspicions of the short
sellers were seemingly validated, and regulators alleged that Longfin’s IPO was
replete with fraud from the very start.4 Throughout this saga, Longfin was
heavily shorted, much to the chagrin of Meenavalli, who pointed much of his ire
in their direction.5 Notably, many of these short sellers were retail traders who
congregated in online discussion forums to investigate Longfin and trade on
their shared information.6
The alleged improprieties of Meenavalli and his co-conspirators are not,
however, the focus of this Note. Stripping behind the more absurd aspects of
Longfin’s story leaves little more than an alleged run-of-the-mill stock
promotion scheme, albeit one that was quite successful for a short period of time.
Rather, this Note concerns actions undertaken by Nasdaq and other large
1. For an extensive explanation of the mechanics of short selling, see discussion infra Part II.F. For an
explanation of the role short sellers play in the market, see discussion infra Part III.A.
2. See Lily Katz & Brad Oleson, Longfin’s Wild Crypto Ride Goes Beyond Any Short Seller Attack,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-06/don-t-blamelongfin-s-short-sellers-for-crypto-stock-s-wild-ride; Complaint at 7, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Longfin Corp.,
316 F. Supp. 3d 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-2977).
3. See Katz & Oleson, supra note 2.
4. Kate Rooney, SEC Takes Aim at Controversial Crypto Company Longfin, Freezes $27 Million in
Proceeds from Insider Stock Sales, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/sec-freezes-27-million-fromstock-sales-involving-ceo-of-crypto-company-longfin-and-three-others.html (June 11, 2018).
5. Evelyn Cheng, CEO of Controversial Crypto Company Longfin Blames Short Sellers for Stock Plunge,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/04/controversial-crypto-stock-longfin-surges-then-halted-after-itsannounced-ceo-to-appear-on-cnbcs-fast-money.html (Apr. 5, 2018).
6. See discussion infra Part II.E.
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institutions that manifested considerable, unjustified losses by short sellers who
were “too right” about Longfin’s fraudulent nature. Following repeated failures
to recognize and address the various frauds and deficiencies related to the
company, Nasdaq issued a regulatory trading halt on the stock on April 6, 2018,
which stayed in place until Longfin voluntarily delisted to the over-the-counter
(OTC) market and resumed trading on May 25, 2018.7 During this halt, two
rounds of heavily traded put options expired worthless.8 Were it not for the halt,
these put options would all but certainly have been deep in the money, and would
have been highly profitable for their holders. Instead, the put holders were
locked into their positions with no realistic way out, resulting in a total loss for
most.
This Note uses the story of Longfin to argue that retail traders and the
market overall would be better served by stricter limitations on the use of certain
types of trading halts by Nasdaq and similarly situated self-regulating
organizations (SROs). In Part I, the Note will explain in brief the SRO system,
the reasons for its existence, and pertinent details surrounding the use of trading
halts by SROs, particularly the legal ramifications (or lack thereof) that follow
a halt. In Part II, the Note will place the reader in the shoes of traders who
watched the company’s rise and fall by recounting the factual background of
Longfin, progressing chronologically from the company’s IPO to its condition
as of this writing, while focusing on the circumstances surrounding the
protracted T12 trading halt that preceded Longfin delisting from the Nasdaq and
the harm thus caused. Additionally, this Part will explore certain contextual
aspects of Longfin’s story that reinforce the justification for change, and explain
some of the jargon and trading technicalities that must be understood in order to
recognize the problem highlighted by this Note. Following this factual
background, Part III will provide a condensed analysis of potential liabilities for
involved parties, which will show that the harmed investors have no realistic
prospect of recovery through litigation. Finally, Part IV will explain why the
problem highlighted by Longfin is better solved ex ante through changes in
regulation rather than through extension of liability and will propose and
examine various solutions to the problem. These proposed changes will center
around limiting or eliminating SRO power to issue certain types of trading halts
and will also weigh the benefits of requiring greater transparency in the use of
such halts.

7. See discussion infra Part II.J.
8. See discussion infra Part II.K.
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I. SROS WIELD CONSIDERABLE REGULATORY POWER
A. THE SRO SYSTEM
Though SROs in the financial context have existed in concept for hundreds
of years,9 modern day SROs are rooted in statute; of principal concern here, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 SROs, which institute and enforce their own
rules, are foundational to the modern securities regulation scheme, described by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as “a basic premise of the
Exchange Act.”11 The Exchange Act issues a directive to SROs that is similar in
substance to that given to the SEC itself, dictating that an SRO’s rules must be
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote
just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination
with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information
with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a
national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest.12

While SROs are not entirely independent—their rulemaking processes being
subject to oversight by federal agencies13—they retain “significant autonomy to
determine the fundamental elements of their operating policies and governance
structure.”14 This oversight relationship is often described as deferential, with
the SEC rarely disapproving SRO rulemaking proposals.15
Putting aside analysis of this regime’s effectiveness, the primary reasons
for its inception as a codified legal reality were its political and economic
expediency.16 Maintaining a system of self-regulation was simply the path of
9. Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574, 2580
(2000) (describing the emergence of SROs to regulate primitive rice futures exchanges in seventeenth-century
Japan).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (defining a self-regulatory organization as “any national securities exchange,
registered securities association, or registered clearing agency”).
11. Commission Guidance and Amendment to the Rules Relating to Organization and Program
Management Concerning Proposed Rule Changes Filed by Self-Regulatory Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,144,
40,144 (July 11, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 241).
12. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (emphasis added), with 15 U.S.C. § 78b (listing as one of the purposes
of the Exchange Act “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets”).
13. Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 202
(2013) (discussing statutes authorizing administrative oversight of SRO rulemaking).
14. Id. at 201.
15. Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1736 (2016)
(suggesting an “understanding” that agencies defer to SROs in SRO rulemaking); Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking
the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 695 (2010) (“[I]n practice,
the agency has fully delegated these regulatory functions to privately funded SROs, choosing instead to function
as the watchful guard and supervisor ensuring that the SROs perform their statutory duties in an appropriate
manner.”).
16. As of today, self-regulators in the financial industry were a “force[] to be reckoned with” in the 1934
political arena. Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the
Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 481 (1984). “From the
outset . . . Congress assumed that its task included incorporating the existing self-regulatory institutions (i.e., the
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least resistance in 1934. Since then, the financial sector has only increased in
political influence and complexity, bolstering the motivations for legislative
recognition of SROs. As such, whatever statutory changes may come as to the
oversight and autonomy of SROs, abrogation of the system in its entirety in the
foreseeable future is eminently unlikely.
Proponents of the SRO system tend to point to the government’s relative
inability to regulate the erstwhile self-regulated financial industry,17 suggesting
that the subject-matter knowledge and relative agility of industry insiders makes
them better suited to exercise regulatory authority.18 Other purported benefits
include the speed with which SROs can respond to changes in the market as
compared to government agencies.19 More abstractly, advocates sometimes
point to a sense of ownership and representation fostered by the SRO system
within those they regulate.20 It follows that this sense of inclusion might lead to
productive, collaborative interactions with government regulators, as opposed to
wasteful, adversarial interactions and non-compliance by private actors.
Opponents of SROs are likely to point to that very “sense of ownership” as
a glaring deficiency of the system. The so-called “revolving door” of
employment at the SEC, wherein SEC employees and appointees leave the
Commission to advocate on behalf of the companies they formerly regulated
(and invariably, for far greater compensation), is one of the most vigorously
debated and oft-cited examples of regulatory capture.21 The threat of regulatory

stock exchanges) into the new regulatory system.” Id. Despite frequent criticism, the SRO system endures
“because lawmakers have generally regarded self-regulation to be a practical and efficient way to outsource the
burdens of regulation to the private sector.” Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the
SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 323 (2007).
17. Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47
ADMIN. L. R EV. 171, 181 (1995).
18. Id.
Lawyers, economists, and political scientists have created a diverse literature on government
regulation. Overall, they have identified five distinct advantages of audited self-regulation over
other regulatory techniques. First, rules can be more effective because of the self-regulator’s
superior knowledge of the subject compared to the government agency. Second, self-regulation
allows for more diversity in methods of compliance with legal rules than is possible for a
government agency to provide. Third, self-regulation may result in better compliance with rules,
no matter who promulgates them or how they are designed, because self-enforcement is more
effective and more easily accepted by the regulated entities. Fourth, self-regulation can result in
cost savings to the government, and these savings may be greater than the costs imposed on private
groups, thus resulting in less costly regulation overall. Finally, self-regulation is consistent with
modern regulatory reform characterized by the retreat from bureaucratic “command and control”
methods of regulation.
Id.
19. Omarova, supra note 15, at 674.
20. Id.
21. Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, S.E.C.’s Revolving Door Hurts Its Effectiveness, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/s-e-c-s-revolvingdoor-hurts-its-effectiveness-report-says; Dominic Rushe, Mary Schapiro: The Latest Official Through the
Regulatory Revolving Door, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2013/apr/02/mary-schapiro-sec-revolving-door; Francine McKenna, Speed of Revolving Door Between SEC and
Private Sector Is Shocking, Says Expert on Regulatory Capture, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 7, 2018, 10:33 AM),
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capture is, of course, that regulators will act in the best interests of their
prospective future employers rather than the market whose integrity they are
supposed to protect. For those wary of regulatory capture, the SRO is the very
culmination of those fears. Rather than private actors simply exerting undue
influence over regulators, in an SRO system, the private actors themselves are
tasked with a substantial portion of their own regulation. Though SROs are
supposed to act in the best interests of the market as a whole,22 the possibilities
for conflicts of interest in such a system are obvious,23 and although the SEC
and SROs have acted to address these concerns,24 the possibility for such
conflicts are an inherent part of any SRO system. Other criticisms of the system
include “widespread collective action problems, lack of effective enforcement
capabilities, inability of self-regulatory organizations to gain or maintain
legitimacy, and, ultimately, the failure of accountability.”25 Further, though the
SEC reviews SRO rulemaking before passage, there is no formal process for
critical evaluation of existing rules.26 Another major point of contention is the
extension of absolute immunity to SROs acting in their regulatory capacity,
which will be discussed in detail below.
B. QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF SROS
Once a luxury afforded only to judges, the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity—an absolute bar on actions against government entities for damages
stemming from their activities—has been iteratively expanded to cover a wide
range of governmental activities, and even to SROs in the discharge of their
regulatory duties.27 Despite frequent criticism centering around the lack of
accountability the doctrine creates,28 and a rare narrowing interpretation in

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/speed-of-revolving-door-between-sec-and-private-sector-is-shockingsays-expert-on-regulatory-capture-2018-12-07.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2018).
23. Critics of self-regulation tend to view it as “self-serving, self-interested, lacking in sanctions, beset
with free rider problems, and simply a sham.” Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 115 (2001).
24. Dombalagian, supra note 16, at 333 (describing SRO’s efforts to bifurcate their business and regulatory
operations to reduce conflicts of interest). Many of the regulatory functions once performed by the exchanges
have been carved out to the non-profit FINRA, presumably resolving many conflict of interest issues; however,
of relevance here, regulation of each exchange’s individual market remains the responsibility of that exchange.
Andrew J. Cavo, Note, Weissman v. National Association of Securities Dealers: A Dangerously Narrow
Interpretation of Absolute Immunity for Self-Regulatory Organizations, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 415, 424 (2009).
25. Omarova, supra note 15, at 675.
26. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-625, Securities Regulation: Opportunities Exist to Improve
SEC’s Oversight of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 25 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/600/591222.pdf.
27. For a detailed examination of the development of absolute immunity jurisprudence as it pertains to
SROs, see Rohit A. Nafday, Comment, From Sense to Nonsense and Back Again: SRO Immunity, Doctrinal
Bait-and-Switch, and a Call for Coherence, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2010).
28. E.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and
Absolute Immunity, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 201, 222 (2012).
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Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,29 the already-expansive protection
that this doctrine affords SROs has only expanded further in recent years.30
SROs are afforded absolute immunity when performing their “quasigovernmental” duties; while this vague term is subject to continual debate, it has
been further explained to mean activities that “‘relate[] to the proper functioning
of the regulatory system’” such that the SRO “‘stands in the shoes of the
SEC.’”31
Though the exact borders of the doctrine remain unclear, there are certain
categories that fall squarely within it:
(1) disciplinary proceedings against exchange members; (2) the enforcement
of security rules and regulations and general regulatory oversight over
exchange members; (3) the interpretation of the securities laws and
regulations as applied to the exchange or its members; (4) the referral of
exchange members to the SEC and other government agencies for civil
enforcement or criminal prosecution under the securities laws; and (5) the
public announcement of regulatory decisions.32

Occasionally, courts have applied absolute immunity to specific actions.
Of particular relevance here is Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., wherein the court stated that “there are few functions more
quintessentially regulatory than suspension of trading.”33
C. THE T12 HALT
Trading halts, put simply, suspend all trading on a stock and its options
until the halt is lifted, and are put in place for a variety of reasons, ranging from
deficiencies in regulatory filings to dramatic price swings.34
As an initial matter, no one has meaningfully questioned Nasdaq’s legal
authority to emplace the halt at issue in this Note, nor has anyone attempted to
sue Nasdaq for the damages incurred as a result. Any such suit would be doomed
from the outset. In addition to the general authority to make and enforce rules
granted to SROs by the Exchange Act,35 the SEC promulgated a rule specifically
29. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007). Though
Weissman introduced an apparent jurisdictional split and is of great relevance to the debate surrounding absolute
immunity for SROs, the nature of the actions at issue in Weissman are so different in character to those
undertaken by Nasdaq here that the holding is beyond the scope of this Note and does not merit deeper
discussion.
30. E.g., In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating explicitly that there
is no fraud exception to SRO absolute immunity, even in the “most unusual circumstances,” and that SRO
inaction is also protected by absolute immunity).
31. Id. at 96 (quoting D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001)).
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that NASD was immune to a suit brought because of a trading halt), abrogated by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016).
34. Press Release, FINRA Issues New Investor Alert: When Trading Stops: What You Need to Know
About Halts, Suspensions and Other Interruptions (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.finra.org/media-center/newsreleases/2012/finra-issues-new-investor-alert-when-trading-stops-what-you-need-know.
35. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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granting exchanges the power to halt trading “in accordance with [the
exchange’s] rules.”36 The rule does not place a time limit on halts, suggesting
that they can continue indefinitely unless “it shall appear to the Commission that
such suspension is designed to evade the provisions of section 12(d) and the
rules and regulations thereunder relating to the withdrawal and striking of a
security from listing and registration.”37 Thus, as long as an SRO invokes one of
its own rules to issue a halt, that halt is proper.
Nasdaq’s rules include a multitude of scenarios in which it either may or
shall issue a halt on various types of securities.38 In general, the rules authorize
Nasdaq to initiate halts when it “deems it necessary to protect investors and the
public interest,” pursuant to a list of scenarios described by the rules.39 Per
Nasdaq, a T12 code indicates that trading on the security is “halted pending
receipt of additional information requested by NASDAQ.”40 Though the Nasdaq
rules lack any explanation of which halt code aligns with the rule it invokes, T12
appears to correspond with Rule 4120(a)(5), which states that the exchange
may halt trading in a security listed on Nasdaq when Nasdaq requests from
the issuer information relating to: (A) material news; (B) the issuer’s ability
to meet Nasdaq listing qualification requirements . . . ; or (C) any other
information which is necessary to protect investors and the public interest.41

Whereas some of the halt justifications and the procedures and
consequences they implicate are laid out with great specificity,42 Rule
4120(b)(5) is quite vague, and lacks clarifying language beyond the general
proviso of Rule 4120(a). As such, the rules provide very little for outsiders to go
on when trying to interpret a T12 halt. All one can deduce from seeing the T12
code is that Nasdaq is seeking additional information from the issuer. Given the
catchall of Rule 4120(b)(5)(C), that information could be almost anything. Rule
4120(c) contains further detail on the procedures involved in initiating any of
the listed halts, but there is little there to explain under what circumstances a
T12 halt will be lifted—only a requirement that Nasdaq disseminate notice when
a halt is issued.43

36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1(a) (2019).
37. In other words, the halt can continue indefinitely unless the SEC determines that the exchange is
purposefully dragging its heels to prevent a stock from delisting. See id § 240.12d21(b).
38. NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULEBOOK § 4120 (2020), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/
rulebook/nasdaq/rules/nasdaq-4000.
39. Id. § 4120(a).
40. Trading Halts, NASDAQ TRADER, https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=tradehaltcodes (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
41. NASDAQ, supra note 38, § 4120(a)(5).
42. See id. § 4120(a)(12). Several of these halts are limit-up/limit-down halts, commonly referred to as
“circuit breakers”—halts that trigger automatically when a security’s price moves a certain amount over a short
period of time in order to combat excess volatility and stabilize the market. In contrast to the T12 halt at issue
here, which is issued at the discretion of Nasdaq, circuit breakers begin and end according to set indicators and
time limits and are not discretionary. For more detail on circuit breakers, see Jason Fernando, Circuit Breaker,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/circuitbreaker.asp (Jan 28, 2021).
43. See NASDAQ, supra note 38, § 4120(c).
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II. THE SAGA OF LONGFIN CORP.
A. SETTING THE STAGE: THE CRYPTO CRAZE OF 2017
On December 7, 2017, the price of Bitcoin, which began the year at around
$900,44 broke $19,000 for the first time.45 The cryptocurrency craze that
dominated the year’s headlines and enticed many novice investors (or
speculators, depending on who you ask) was at its absolute peak. There was
certainly no shortage of doubters—foremost among them being Warren Buffett,
who described the cryptocurrency in 2014 as a “mirage” with little intrinsic
value.46 The skeptics were widely ignored; drowned out, perhaps, by the scores
of newly-minted cryptocurrency millionaires roaring down Main Street in their
Lamborghinis.47
Whatever the merits of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology writ
large may be, the lack of regulation, the difficulty faced by a layperson in
understanding the underlying technology, and the incredible hype generated by
Bitcoin’s success makes the area ripe for scams, frauds, and simple irrational
exuberance—often resulting in spectacular implosions.48 As the end of 2017
approached and Bitcoin continued hitting new all-time-highs, this trend
announced its arrival on Wall Street. In October, Bioptix, Inc., formerly a
manufacturer of medical diagnostic equipment, announced a pivot to Bitcoin
mining and a name change to “Riot Blockchain,” sending the company’s stock
price surging some 600%.49 In December, drinks manufacturer Long Island Iced
Tea Corp. followed suit, announcing a similar pivot and a name change to “Long
Blockchain Corp.,” resulting in a more than 400% increase in stock price.50
Since then, both companies have seen a precipitous decline in value
44. Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited, COINDESK (DEC.
30, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revisited.
45. Evelyn Cheng & Fred Imbert, Bitcoin Tops Record $19,000, Then Plunges in Wild 2-Day Ride, CNBC
(Dec. 7, 2017, 8:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/06/bitcoin-tops-13000-surging-1000-in-less-than-24hours.html.
46. Tae Kim, Bitcoin Up Sevenfold Since Warren Buffett Warned Digital Currency Was a ‘Mirage’, CNBC
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/07/bitcoin-up-sevenfold-since-warren-buffett-warned-digitalcurrency-was-a-mirage.html.
47.The trend of early crypto speculators buying Lamborghinis and other flashy purchases with their newfound
wealth was so prevalent that it became a meme, with some variation of “when lambo” becoming a recurring
comment in online crypto discussions. Gareth Jenkinson, Lambos, Bling and Mansions—What Purchases Do
Crypto Millionaires Make, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/lambos-blingand-mansions-what-purchases-do-crypto-millionaire-make.
48. Jean Eaglesham & Dave Michaels, Crypto Craze Drew Them in; Fraud, in Many Cases, Emptied Their
Pockets, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/crypto-craze-drew-them-infraud-in-many-cases-emptied-their-pockets-11545820200.
49. Tamara Chuang, CEO of Colorado Biotech-Turned-Blockchain Company Explains Why He Sold Stock
After Price Quadrupled, DENVER POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/11/riot-blockchain-bioptixcastle-rock/ (May 21, 2018); see also Lily Katz, A Biotech Company Changed Its Name to ‘Riot Blockchain’
and Its Stock Is Surging, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201710-04/from-biotech-to-bitcoin-bioptix-shifts-focus-to-blockchain.
50. Arjun Reddy, The Iced-Tea Company That Pivoted to Blockchain Is Finally Going All in on
Blockchain, BUSINESS INSIDER: MARKETS INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2019, 3:06 PM), https://markets.business
insider.com/currencies/news/long-blockchain-crypto-pivot-is-complete-2019-3-1028012464.
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commensurate with their sudden rise, SEC investigations, and a bevy of civil
suits against the companies or their officers from regulators and investors alike.51
Longfin Corp. soon followed—while attracting considerably more attention. 52
B. THE LONGFIN IPO

Longfin debuted on the Nasdaq exchange on December 13, 2017.53 Making
use of the relaxed reporting and registration requirements afforded to microcap
public offerings under Regulation A+ of the Jumpstart Our Business Startup
(JOBS) Act,54 the company described itself as “a leading global FinTech
company powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning.”55 The
company’s offering circular describes Chairman and CEO Venkat Meenavalli
as a “global techno entrepreneur,” a “financial wizard,” and perhaps most
51. Riot Blockchain remains under SEC investigation, and its former CEO departed after being implicated
by the SEC in an unrelated pump and dump scheme. Jennifer Schlesinger, Scott Zamost, Hannah Kliot & Ritika
Shah, Riot Blockchain SEC Investigation Is ‘Still Ongoing’, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/11/21/riot-blockchain-sec-investigation-is-still-ongoing.html. Long Blockchain also remains under SEC
investigation and was delisted by Nasdaq after falling below the $35 million market cap listing requirement.
Tom McKay, ‘Long Blockchain’ Maybe Not as Smart as It Thought, GIZMODO (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:45 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/long-blockchain-maybe-not-as-smart-as-it-thought-1828042681.
52. See Crypto Reg A+ to Delists from Nasdaq, PUBCOCEO (May 7, 2018), https://pubcoceo.com/2018/
05/07/crypto-reg-a-to-delists-from-nasdaq/ (providing photograph of Longfin IPO).
53. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Celebrated Its IPO on Nasdaq (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/12/13/1261643/0/en/Longfin-Corp-Celebrated-its-IPOon-Nasdaq.html.
54. Longfin has since become a poster child for critics of Reg A+ offerings, who point to the company as
evidence that this provision of the JOBS Act opened the doors to fraud. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham & Aaron Back,
Longfin Collapse Puts Focus on Lax IPO Rules, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/longfin-collapse-puts-focus-on-lax-ipo-rules-1522788520.
55. See Press Release, supra note 53.
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dubiously, an “eloquent speaker.”56 Longfin drew little attention in its first two
days of trading, reaching an intraday high of $6.94 and closing at $5.17 from a
starting price of $5 on its first day.57 Total volume across the first two days of
trading was less than 500,000.58
Though it would only come to light months later, Longfin’s listing appears
to have been fraudulent from the start.59 In an opinion granting a SEC motion to
extend an asset freeze on the proceeds of stock sales by Meenavalli and his
alleged co-conspirators, the court found it likely that a significant number of
Longfin’s IPO shares were, rather than sold to the public, gifted to company
insiders in an apparent effort to meet Nasdaq’s minimum publicly held share
requirement for listing.60 Apparently, Longfin fabricated these and other similar
transactions, and along with a slew of other lies, omissions, and obfuscations
aimed at meeting the minimum requirements, fraudulently obtained a listing on
Nasdaq’s exchange.61
C. THE ZIDDU “ACQUISITION”
Longfin’s obscurity was short-lived. Before market open on Friday,
December 15th, two days after the company’s quiet debut on the Nasdaq
exchange, Longfin unveiled its master stroke: the acquisition of Ziddu.com, a
“[b]lockchain-empowered solutions provider that offers Microfinance Lending
against Collateralized Warehouse Receipts in the form of Ziddu Coins.”62
Whatever that string of words may mean, one word within it—blockchain—had
an immediate and profound effect on the company’s stock price.63 That day,
trade volume on shares of Longfin topped 15,000,000—approximately 50x the
volume seen on the first day of trading—and the company closed at $22.01,
already a major uptick from the previous day’s close of $5.39.64 With the story
of Longfin’s rapid ascent having percolated over the weekend, and in
combination with the stock’s low liquidity due to extremely limited public

56. Longfin Corp., Offering Statement (Form 1-A) (Mar. 10, 2017), https://sec.report/Document/
0001699683-17-000001/.
57. LFIN Historical Data, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/lfin/historical (last visited Feb. 4,
2021).
58. Id.
59. See SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 743, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
60. Id.
61. For examples of Longfin’s multifarious deceptions, see Grant Beaty, 9 Reasons Why Nasdaq Should
Delist LongFin Immediately, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 17, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/
4163537-9-reasons-nasdaq-delist-longfin-immediately.
62. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Acquires Ziddu.com, a Blockchain-Empowered Global
Micro-Lending Solutions Provider (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/
12/15/1262779/0/en/Longfin-Corp-Acquires-Ziddu-com-A-Blockchain-empowered-Global-Micro-lendingSolutions-Provider.html.
63. Matt Levine, Maybe Crypto Will Make Securities Fraud Obsolete, BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Dec. 19,
2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-20/maybe-crypto-will-makesecurities-fraud-obsolete.
64. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
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float,65 the stock price catapulted further upwards on Monday, December 18th,
reaching an intraday high of $142.82 and closing at $72.38.66 Using the
December 18th closing price, Longfin’s market cap was approximately $6.2
billion—a more than 1200% increase in value from the company’s listing only
five days prior.67
Curiously, Longfin stated in the 8-K announcing the Ziddu acquisition that
the deal actually took place on December 11th,68 raising questions as to why the
disclosure was filed several days after the company had already publicly listed.69
Even more curious was the entity selling Ziddu to Longfin in exchange for 2.5
million shares of the company: Meridian Enterprises Pte. Ltd., a private
company based out of Singapore that happened to be 95% owned by none other
than Venkat Meenavalli.70 Many were skeptical of the notion that Meenavalli
effectively selling to himself an asset the SEC later described as having “no
ascertainable value”71 justified a 1200% increase in stock price;72 and so, in a
move that was bold if nothing else, Venkat Meenavalli scheduled an in-studio
appearance during after-hours trading on December 18th on CNBC’s Fast
Money program to put forth a valiant defense of his company’s legitimacy.73
D. THE FIRST CNBC INTERVIEW
Meenavalli’s first live television appearance began during after-hours
trading on the afternoon of December 18th. From the outset of the broadcast,
CNBC made clear that Meenavalli would be put on the defensive—emblazoned
at the bottom of the screen was the tagline “Crypto stock or crypto scam?”74 As
the hosts grilled him on the eyebrow-raising circumstances of the Ziddu
acquisition and the lack of clarity in regard to what Longfin actually does,
Meenavalli grew increasingly flustered, responding with a mix of half-answers
and non-answers.75 When asked how many Bitcoin transactions Longfin has

65. Public float refers to the number of shares held by the public, and thus available to trade. Mary Hall,
What Exactly Is a Company’s Float?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-iscompanys-float/ (May 19, 2019). Longfin’s liquidity was deceptively low in part because of the fraudulent share
issuance to company insiders disguised as IPO sales; nearly half of the supposedly publicly held shares were in
fact restricted shares owned by insiders and affiliates, which shares they illegally tried to sell after public listing.
SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 743, 752–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
66. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
67. Levine, supra note 63.
68. Longfin Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1699683/000169968317000040/8kacquisition.htm.
69. Beaty, supra note 61.
70. Longfin Corp., supra note 68.
71. Complaint at 3, SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-2977).
72. Nicole Bullock & Robin Wigglesworth, Blockchain Fervour Evokes Memories of Dotcom Bubble, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/40ec964a-e429-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec.
73. Evelyn Cheng, CEO of Cryptocurrency Play Up 1,000% in 2 Days to $3.1 Million: ‘This Market Cap
Is Not Justified’, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2017, 10:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/18/ceo-of-surgingcryptocurrency-stock-this-market-cap-is-not-justified.html.
74. Fast Money (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 18, 2017).
75. See id.
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engaged in, Meenavalli responded, “I own 140 Bitcoins.” 76 He repeatedly
stated, “I am a profitable company,” mentioned his “team of quants,” and
contended that companies like Longfin are “the Geicos of the world.”77 He
frequently mentioned “disintimidation,” possibly a mispronunciation of
“disintermediation.”78 He repeatedly told the Fast Money hosts, no less than
eleven times, some variation of this Note’s titular line: “you have to
understand.”79 When pressed by the hosts, Meenavalli acknowledged the
absurdity of his company’s market cap, disclaiming it as “not justified” and the
result of “euphoric mania.”80 Between market close and the start of the CNBC
interview, Longfin’s stock price stabilized around $77. As the interview
progressed, Longfin’s price dropped some 16% in after-hours trading, with
CNBC helpfully displaying this sharp downward trend in a chart next to
Meenavalli’s face.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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E. VENKAT BREAKS THE INTERNET
Whatever its intended effect, Meenavalli’s interview turned him into a
minor celebrity in certain circles of the internet; most notably, the Reddit
subforum /r/Wallstreetbets, which boasts about 1.6 million subscribers as of this
publication and serves as one of the internet’s most popular gathering places for
retail traders.81 Though Longfin garnered relatively little attention on the forum
81. Wallstreetbets, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). Though
ostensibly a place for retail traders to gather and share their research, participation in Wallstreetbets centers more
around highly risky and minimally-informed trades, often using complex derivative strategies that the users don’t
fully understand, glorification of trading losses (so-called “loss porn”), and the use of crass and offensive humor.
See Roisin Kiberd, You Probably Shouldn’t Bet Your Savings on Reddit’s ‘Wallstreetbets’, MOTHERBOARD
(Dec. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/nedzqm/you-probably-shouldnt-betyour-savings-on-reddits-wallstreetbets; Jake Davidson, Meet the Bros Behind /r/WallStreetBets, Who Lose
Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars in a Day—And Brag About It, MONEY (Oct. 25, 2018), http://money.com/
money/5405922/wall-street-bets/. Most recently, the forum made headlines when one user mistakenly thought
he had discovered a foolproof arbitrage strategy called a box spread, often used with European style options,
calling it “risk free money.” Shawn Langlois, Trader Says He Has ‘No Money at Risk,’ Then Promptly Loses
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prior to the CNBC interview,82 Meenavalli’s live television performance
generated significant interest. In a post titled “LFIN CEO talks nonsense for
eleven minutes on CNBC,” user Shauncore provides a narrative of the interview,
describing Meenavalli’s first few minutes of speech as a “Michelin star quality
word salad” and generating over 1000 upvotes and hundreds of comments from
entertained and curious users.83 This interest resulted in “you have to
understand” becoming a meme within the forum,84 and a significant number of
retail traders looking for short plays on Longfin.85 Longfin garnered attention
from retail traders on a number of other social media platforms in addition to
Wallstreetbets—other investing-related subforums on Reddit,86 stock market
focused Twitter facsimile StockTwits,87 and the crowdsourced financial analysis
site Seeking Alpha.88 Collectively, users on these sites actively researched and
discussed the company and related trading strategies. As will be discussed later
in this Note, these retail traders appear to have frequently beat financial
institutions and regulators to the punch in peeling back the layers of Longfin’s
allegedly fraudulent onion. It was these retail traders who would go on to be
deprived of much of the benefit of their work due to the regulatory flaw this Note
seeks to highlight.
F. SHORTING LONGFIN
Prior to January 30, 2018, prospective Longfin shorts had only one
mechanism by which they could bet against the stock: traditional short selling,
or borrowing shares (usually from one’s broker) to sell now, with the promise to
return the same number of shares later, with hopes that those returned shares will

Almost 2,000%, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 22, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trader-says-hehas-no-money-at-risk-then-promptly-loses-almost-2000-2019-01-22. In reality, the user failed to recognize the
risk of early assignment inherent to American style options, resulting in a 2000% loss when his brokerage
stepped in and closed the trade. Id. The user, posting under the name 1R0NYMAN, became one of the forum’s
most popular and pervasive memes, held out as the best example of the forum’s philosophy to date. Id.
82. The first post relating to Longfin generated only twenty-five upvotes and forty-five comments, with
most commenters expressing extreme skepticism towards the company. TickerTanker, Anyone Playing LFIN?,
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/7kl8hu/anyone_playing_lfin/ (last visited Feb. 4,
2021).
83. Shauncore, LFIN CEO Talks Nonsense for Eleven Minutes on CNBC, REDDIT (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/7kxpwc/lfin_ceo_talks_nonsense_for_eleven_minutes_on_
cnbc/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). “Upvotes” are given out by Reddit users to signify interest in a post. See Matt
Silverman, Reddit: A Beginner’s Guide, MASHABLE (June 6, 2012), https://mashable.com/2012/06/06/redditfor-beginners/.
84. See, e.g., hepcecob, Can Someone Explain the “You Have to Understand” Meme?, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/8axbd9/can_someone_explain_the_you_have_to_understan
d/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
85. See, e.g., moritzplatz, Give Me Some LFIN to Short, Please :(((, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/
r/wallstreetbets/comments/7lbaot/give_me_some_lfin_to_short_please/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
86. See, e.g., ishkabum, Why Is Short Selling Not Allowed on Longfin?, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/
r/investing/comments/7lcita/why_is_short_selling_not_allowed_on_longfin/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
87. See Longfin Corp., STOCKTWITS, https://stocktwits.com/symbol/LFIN (Feb. 4, 2021).
88. See LFIN—Longfin Corp., SEEKING ALPHA, https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/LFIN (Feb. 4, 2021).
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be purchased at a substantially lower price with the short seller pocketing the
difference.89
While potentially lucrative, short selling can be unattractive for a number
of reasons. First, because there is no upper limit on share price, short selling can
theoretically result in unlimited loss.90 Second, short selling requires the use of
a margin account, which allows the accountholder to trade “on margin”; in other
words, with money (or shares) borrowed from the broker, upon which the
borrower must pay the broker interest.91 Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) requires a minimum of $2000 in cash or equity value to open
a margin account,92 making margin trading—and thus short selling—
inaccessible to those with very small accounts.
Third, margin accounts require maintenance margin, a minimum amount
of equity value relative to the amount borrowed from the broker.93 Falling below
this level results in a margin call, wherein the broker demands that the
accountholder deposit enough value into the account to bring it back within
margin requirements. If the accountholder does not do so within a certain
timeframe, the broker will close positions and liquidate the account’s assets until
it is brought back within the requirements.94 This can be disastrous for the
accountholder, as those positions are likely to be closed at inopportune times,
possibly resulting in an otherwise avoidable loss or worse.
Fourth, the need to fend off the aforementioned margin requirements
combined with a desire on the part of short sellers to limit losses can create a
phenomenon known as a “short squeeze”—if the shorted stock sharply increases
in value, short sellers will buy back shares to cover their positions and limit their
losses.95 This buy pressure, in turn, further increases the stock price, forcing even
more short sellers out of their positions and creating a feedback loop that can
result in huge losses for shorts caught unaware.96
Finally, borrowing shares to short sell requires the seller to pay the lending
broker a fee, calculated as a percentage of position value, for the privilege;97
assuming, of course, that the broker can obtain the shares and is willing to lend
them in the first place. The more difficult it is for the broker to find lendable

89. For a more detailed explanation of short selling, see James Chen, Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp (Feb. 4, 2020).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. FINRA, RULES & GUIDANCE § 4210(b)(4) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/
finra-rules/4210.
93. Purchasing on Margin, Risks Involved with Trading in a Margin Account, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/investors/purchasing-margin-risks-involved-trading-margin-account (last visited Feb. 4,
2021).
94. Id.
95. See Cory Mitchell, Short Squeeze, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
shortsqueeze.asp (Apr. 19, 2020).
96. See id.
97. James Chen, Stock Loan Fee Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stockloan-fee.asp (Apr. 14, 2019).
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shares (that is, the more illiquid the market), the higher the fee.98 In the case of
highly liquid securities, such as shares of a blue chip company such as Apple,
these fees are fairly low. If the market is illiquid, however, the fees can be
prohibitively high, and if the shares are classified as “hard to borrow,” the fees
can be astronomical.99 In 2018, borrow fees for shares of Tesla were somewhat
high as the company was heavily shorted relative to its size, averaging around
2.5% annualized as of August that year.100 In comparison, borrow fees for
Longfin exceeded 200% annualized on multiple occasions and rarely dipped
below 100%, with an average borrow fee of 183% as of April 2018.101 With
short interest consistently over one million shares during this time period,
substantially all of the company’s public float was sold short.102 With such high
fees, even steady declination in the stock price can easily be outpaced by the cost
to borrow, making traditional short selling of companies like Longfin an
unpalatable way to bet against them.
For traders put off by the risks and barriers to entry of traditional short
selling, the next best (often better, depending on the circumstances) alternative
is to buy derivatives called put options.103 A put option, usually just called a
“put,” is a contract that gives the buyer (who takes a “long put” position), in
exchange for a premium paid to the seller, the right, but not the obligation to sell
a certain number of underlying securities (usually shares of a company or fund
in lots of 100) at a certain price (the “strike price”) to the put seller (or “writer”)
within a specified time frame dictated by fixed expiry dates.104 If the strike price
of the put is above the price of the underlying shares, then the put is “in the
money” and has an intrinsic value of the strike price less the price of the
underlying.105 If the strike price of the put is below the price of the underlying,
the put has no intrinsic value.106 The premium paid above the intrinsic value of
a put is called time value; in essence, the amount the buyer is willing to pay for
the likelihood that the put will increase in value in the time left before it
expires.107 Explained in the simplest possible terms, the value of a put goes up
as the underlying stock price goes down. There is significantly more complexity

98. Id.
99. The Motley Fool, If You Aren’t Careful, This Brokerage Fee Could Wipe You Out, NASDAQ (June 11,
2016, 8:24 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/if-you-arent-careful-brokerage-fee-could-wipe-you-out2016-06-11.
100. Elena Popina, So You Want to Short Tesla. Here’s What You Pay to Pull It Off, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 24,
2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-24/so-you-want-to-short-tesla-here-swhat-you-pay-to-pull-it-off.
101. Katz & Oleson, supra note 2.
102. Id.
103. Though not relevant here, a “short call” position, entered by selling call options, is another mechanism
by which a trader can effectively short a stock. See Troy Segal, Short Call, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short-call.asp (Jan. 28, 2021).
104. Justin Kuepper, Put Option, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/putoption.asp (Jan.
28, 2021).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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to options and options pricing than is explained here,108 but the takeaway most
pertinent to this Note is that an options position is uniquely time sensitive in a
way that a short sale is not. While a short position can theoretically be
maintained as long as the holder is able to finance the associated fees, interest,
and margin requirements, options have hard and fast expiration dates past which
they are worthless.
In exchange for this strict time sensitivity, a put buyer gains several
advantages over a short seller. First, whereas short selling carries unlimited
downside risk, buying an option risks only the premium paid for it—you cannot
lose more money than you put in. Second, because the buyer is not borrowing
anything from the broker, buying options does not require a margin account,
meaning a lower barrier to entry and that the risks associated with margin
lending can be avoided if the trader so desires.109 Third, options trade separately
from the underlying security and thus will not necessarily be liquidity
constrained by an illiquid underlying. Fourth, there are no borrow fees
associated with buying options, so even if the options market is illiquid, ancillary
costs (such as commissions paid to the broker) will not increase as a result.
Taken together, these advantages make buying puts an attractive alternative to
short selling, especially to retail traders who want to short an extremely illiquid
stock like Longfin.
On January 30, 2018, Longfin options opened for trading on the Nasdaq
exchange.110 Though there is some indication that Nasdaq never should have let
Longfin options trade in the first place due to insufficient public float on the
underlying stock,111 trade they did, and thousands of options contracts changed
hands in the handful of months they were listed on Nasdaq’s exchange.112
G. THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
Given the substantial skepticism that many market participants
demonstrated towards the company, Longfin’s stock price showed remarkable
resilience for much of the time it spent listed on Nasdaq’s exchange. Between
the huge spike on December 18, 2017 and mid-March of the next year, Longfin
did not once trade below $30, mostly hovering around $35,113 steadily
maintaining its multibillion-dollar market cap. There was little by way of
meaningful news during this period; if anything, most noteworthy was the
108. For further explanation on options pricing, see Pricing Options, NASDAQ (June 10, 2019, 11:10 AM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/options-guide/pricing-options.aspx.
109. Of course, traders can still buy puts on margin just as they would any other security—it just is not
required.
110. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Options Begin Trading on Nasdaq (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/01/30/1314503/0/en/Longfin-Corp-Options-BeginTrading-on-Nasdaq.html.
111. Jamie Powell, Now NASDAQ Gets in a Tangle [Update], FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/04/19/1524172286000/Now-NASDAQ-gets-in-a-tangle/ (demonstrating that
Longfin’s public float was likely below Nasdaq’s minimum requirements for options trading).
112. Id.
113. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
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absence of news: Longfin failed to issue an earnings report of any variety until
April 2nd, when it filed its first 10-K.114 On January 22th, Longfin entered into
a $52.7 million financing agreement with Hudson Bay Capital Management.115
The terms of this agreement, in which Longfin exchanged convertible notes and
stock warrants for $5 million in cash (less $1.3 million in fees) and a promissory
note set to mature in 2048, were highly unfavorable to Longfin and would
significantly dilute the company’s public float upon completion.116 Besides the
company announcing retention of a new accounting firm and noise about the
rapid decline of Bitcoin,117 there was simply nothing to report about the black
box that was Longfin during this period.
H. AS LONGFIN RALLIES, THE SHORTS PILE IN
On March 16, 2018, trade volume on Longfin, which had rarely broken
past 250,000 in the previous months, suddenly spiked to over 3 million.118 The
high volume persisted over the next few days, and Longfin’s stock price shot
upwards, closing at $71.10 on March 23th—almost double where it had begun
the month.119 The impetus behind this sudden runup was not immediately clear,
leaving some observers baffled.120 On March 22nd, Longfin announced that,
effective March 16th, the company would be included in the FTSE Russell 3000
and 2000 indices, which measure “the performance of the largest 3,000 U.S.
companies” and “the small-cap segment of the U.S. equity market”
respectively.121 These indices serve as benchmarks for providers of passive
investment vehicles called exchange traded funds, which allow investors to buy
a weighted basket of the companies listed in the benchmark index. Thus, on
March 16th, institutional investors and asset managers who offer these products
114. Longfin Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 2, 2018), https://sec.report/Document/000149315218-004481/.
115. Longfin Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 23, 2018), https://sec.report/Document/000169968318-000001/.
116. Kurt B. Feierabend, Longfin Corp.—The Blockchain Falling Knife, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 6, 2018,
10:48 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4143507-longfin-corp-blockchain-falling-knife.
117. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Announces Engagement of CohnReznick LLP as
Principal Accountant (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/02/09/1338491/0/en/
Longfin-Corp-Announces-Engagement-of-CohnReznick-LLP-as-Principal-Accountant.html; Seth Archer,
Companies That Pivoted to Blockchain Are Getting Whacked Amid the Crypto Bloodbath (LBCC, RIOT, LFIN),
BUSINESS INSIDER: MARKETS INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/
currencies/news/bitcoin-price-cryptocurrency-bloodbath-is-dragging-the-pivot-to-crypto-companies-downwith-it-2018-1-1013158496.
118. See LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57. Strangely, volume actually began spiking several days prior
to March 16, 2018, though less dramatically; this may have been funds preemptively buying up Longfin in
anticipation of the Russell inclusion, or perhaps something more sinister—without additional information, this
is merely the subject of speculation. See id.
119. Id.
120. E.g., TygerWithAWhy, I Mean . . . How Is LFIN Still Trading Around 50?, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/85kojo/i_mean_how_is_lfin_still_trading_around_50/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
121. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Joins Russell 2000® Index and Russell 3000® Index
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/03/22/1444316/0/en/Longfin-Corp-JoinsRussell-2000-Index-and-Russell-3000-Index.html.
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such as Blackrock, Vanguard, and Schwab began buying shares of Longfin to
balance their funds tracking the Russell indices.122 This buy pressure, combined
with Longfin’s low public float, drove the huge uptick in share price—by March
21st, these institutions “accumulated a position of 511,244 shares, or 45 per cent
of the entire free float” of the company.123
Many traders, still skeptical of Longfin, viewed this rally as the perfect
opportunity to open a short position on the company.124 In a March 22nd post
titled “Longfin DD: About to go skydiving without a parachute,” Reddit user
Fughazi presents a detailed attack on Longfin’s finances and apparent lack of
actual business operations, concluding with a recommendation to short the
company via puts.125 A March 23rd post from user soundofreedom titled
“LongFin (LFIN): The Biggest Scam of 2018” also recommends buying puts
based on further attacks on the company’s financials, describing the Hudson Bay
financing agreement as “usurious,” and observing that Longfin did not appear to
meet the listing requirements for inclusion in the Russell indices.126 The same
day, an independent analyst published an article on Seeking Alpha that further
explores the questionable decision to index Longfin.127 Noting that FTSE
Russell requires that a minimum of 5% of shares outstanding be publicly held
for a company to be included on their indices,128 the analyst points out that
Longfin reported 1,140,989 publicly held shares against 76,540,989 total shares
outstanding, nowhere near the 5% public float required, and concludes that
Longfin’s inclusion was most likely a mistake on the part of FTSE Russell.129
Mainstream pundits followed close behind. On March 26th, outspoken activist
short seller Andrew Left of Citron Research tweeted: “If you are fortunate
enough to get a borrow,130 indeed $LFIN is a pure stock scheme.
@sec_enforcement should not be far behind. Filings and press releases are
riddled with inaccuracies and fraud.”131 Nasdaq itself hosted what appears to be

122. Jamie Powell, FTSE Russell Gets in a Tangle, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:49 AM),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/03/23/1521820767000/FTSE-Russell-gets-in-a-tangle/.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Fughazi, Longfin DD: About to Go Skydiving Without a Parachute, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/86bc23/longfin_dd_about_to_go_skydiving_without_a/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
125. Id.
126. Soundofreedom, LongFin (LFIN): The Biggest Scam of 2018, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/
r/wallstreetbets/comments/86i52c/longfin_lfin_the_biggest_scam_of_2018/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
127. Grant Beaty, LongFin Popped Because It Was (Probably) Mistakenly Added to FTSE Russell Indices,
SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 23, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4158497-longfin-poppedprobably-mistakenly-added-ftse-russell-indices.
128. FTSE RUSSELL, 4.8 RUSSELL U.S. EQUITY INDEXES: CONSTRUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 28 (2020),
https://research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/Russell-US-indexes.pdf.
129. Beaty, supra note 127.
130. “Borrow” refers to borrowing shares for a short sale; as Left acknowledges, even obtaining a borrow
on Longfin at this point was unlikely. See discussion supra Part II.F.
131. Citron Research (@CitronResearch), TWITTER (Mar. 26, 2018, 6:44 AM), https://twitter.com/Citron
Research/status/978266445237768192.
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a third-party article on their website predicting a downslide.132 The article notes
the difficulty in finding a borrow for a short sale, and recommends buying Mayexpiry puts.133 Notably, none of these mainstream sources appear to have noticed
the float deficiency observed by the retail traders and independent analysts; the
Nasdaq-hosted article even misattributes Longfin’s price rally to a short squeeze,
rather than the already-discovered explanation of the Russell inclusion.134
Around this time, retail traders began buying puts on the company, anticipating
an immense fall.135
I. LONGFIN EXITS THE RUSSELL, AND THE CRACKS WIDEN
After market close on March 26th, only a handful of days after announcing
the addition of Longfin to its indices, FTSE Russell announced that it would
remove the company effective at start of trading on March 29th.136 The retail
traders who called the inclusion into question seem to have been vindicated;
Longfin’s public float was indeed insufficient, and FTSE Russell failed to
notice.137 The institutional investors who bought Longfin shares to balance their
Russell-tracking funds rushed to be the first to dump their positions before the
price fell too far, racking up more than $10 million in losses in the span of a few
days.138 BlackRock funds alone, which accumulated nearly half of Longfin’s
public float, lost some $8 million.139 Longfin’s stock price dropped over 40% on
the news.140 Meenvalli was quick to defend his company, claiming that
expiration of the lockup period on a consultant’s shares would bring Longfin
within the necessary parameters for inclusion in the Russell indices,141 and that
132. Cash in on Longfin Corp After an Insane Crypto Rally, NASDAQ (Mar. 26, 2018, 9:38 AM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/cash-in-on-longfin-corp-after-an-insane-crypto-rally-cm939941.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Several traders posted or discussed their put positions on the Wallstreetbets forum. See, e.g.,
thebeny619, LFIN Down 10%. Praise u/soundofreedom and u/Fughazi, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/
wallstreetbets/comments/87995s/lfin_down_10_praise_usoundofreedom_and_ufughazi/ (last visited Feb. 4,
2021); HowieHubler, $LFIN Puts, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/87bqjo/
lfin_puts/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Slurpieee, Just Got RH Options. I’m All in $LFIN Puts, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/86o843/just_got_rh_options_im_all_in_lfin_puts/
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
136. FTSE RUSSELL, LONGFIN CORP (USA): CONSTITUENT DELETION CHANGES IN RUSSELL E QUAL
WEIGHT INDEX SERIES (2018), https://research.ftserussell.com/products/index-notices/home/getnotice/?id=
2588162.
137. Id.
138. Peter Smith, Investors Nurse $10m Losses on LongFin Index Mistake, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/acb5ddb6-3341-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f03.
139. Id. However, such a loss is nearly inconsequential to a company like BlackRock, which has roughly
$6 trillion in assets under management as of this writing. See, e.g., Christine Williamson, BlackRock’s AUM
Down for the Quarter, Year, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jan. 16, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/
article/20190116/ONLINE/190119897/blackrocks-aum-down-for-the-quarter-year.
140. Evelyn Cheng, Longfin Loses More Than a Third of Its Value After the Controversial Cryptocurrency
Stock Is Booted from the Russell 2000 Index, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/03/27/longfin-loses-a-third-of-it-value-after-it-gets-boot-from-russell-2000.html.
141. Whether or not Meenavalli was telling the truth, the point was moot; the diminution of Longfin’s
market cap made it ineligible for the Russell indices regardless of the company’s public float.
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he planned on bringing legal action against Citron Research for their negative
comments.142 By close of market on April 2nd, Longfin fell to $14.31 per
share.143
The bloodbath was not yet at its end. On April 2nd, Longfin filed a 10-K
report for the first time in company history.144 In it, Longfin disclosed that on
March 5th, the SEC contacted the company to inform it of an ongoing
investigation into its IPO and acquisition of Ziddu, accompanied by document
requests for information pertaining to same.145 Unsurprisingly, Longfin’s stock
price continued to plummet, closing at $9.89 on April 3rd.146 To the bafflement
of observers,147 Meenavalli arranged another live appearance on Fast Money for
April 4th after market close.148 Though this second broadcast failed to produce
the sort of quotables of the first, Meenavalli observers were equally unconvinced
by his defense of the company.149 As the hosts attacked Longfin’s almost
complete lack of business operations, the discrepancies in its financial reporting,
and the suspicious circumstances of stock issuance to Meenvalli’s friends and
family, including a significant number of shares distributed to his wife, who
allegedly attempted to sell them on the open market, Meenavalli calmly
responded without clearly answering any of the hosts’ questions.150 He went on
to blame his company’s woes on short sellers, and threatened to report them to
the SEC and FINRA.151 Over the next two days, Longfin’s stock price surged.152
While perhaps bolstered by Meenavalli’s performance in the second interview,
a more likely explanation for the rally is short sellers buying shares to cover their
positions and take profits, triggering a quasi-short squeeze.153 Either way,
Longfin closed on April 6th at $28.19—its last-ever trading price on Nasdaq’s
exchange.154
J. THE HALT
On April 6nd, Nasdaq halted all trading on Longfin effective 10:01 A.M.
EDT,155 freezing in place the $28.19 share price. Shortly after, the SEC
announced that it had obtained an emergency freeze on $27 million of proceeds

142. Cheng, supra note 140.
143. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
144. Longfin Corp., supra note 114.
145. Id.
146. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
147. Longfin CEO Venkat Meenavalli Embarrassed Himself on CNBC, BOB’S BLITZ,
https://www.bobsblitz.com/2018/04/longfin-ceo-venkat-meenavalli.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
148. Cheng, supra note 5.
149. mjkazkaz, Longfin CEO Getting Destroyed on Fast Money Right Now, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/89tzbe/longfin_ceo_getting_destroyed_on_fast_money_rig
ht/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
150. Fast Money (CNBC television broadcast Apr. 4, 2018).
151. Id.
152. See LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
153. See discussion supra Part II.F.
154. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
155. Rooney, supra note 4.
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from illicit stock sales conducted by Longfin affiliates shortly after the IPO.156
Put-holding retail traders were immediately concerned for their positions,
leading to the creation of a Reddit sub-forum—/r/LongFinOptions—specifically
dedicated to discussing the situation as it unfolded.157 Beyond the T12 code
discussed previously,158 Nasdaq offered little information on their posture
towards the company and what traders could expect in the coming days.
Meanwhile, Longfin unleashed a storm of bad news that, were the company
trading freely, would have exerted significant downward pressure on the stock
price. On April 9th, Longfin announced receipt of a Nasdaq non-compliance
letter received on April 6th stemming from the company’s failure to file a timely
10-Q; the letter demanded that Longfin provide a suitable compliance plan by
April 13th to maintain its listing on the exchange.159 That same day, Longfin
announced that the company’s accounting firm CohnReznick resigned the day
before the halt.160 On April 12th, the company defaulted on the Hudson Bay
financing agreement, making due repayment of $33.6 million in cash or shares
no later than April 20th.161
Examining the discussion of retail traders around this period reveals mass
confusion and a growing sense of anger and panic, with traders desperately
hunting for ways out of their positions.162 On April 20th, 26,951 put options,
4889 of which were already “in the money” were set to expire, constituting tens
of millions of dollars in premium paid and magnitudes of order more in profit
potential.163 Unable to sell their puts and close their positions, holders had one
choice besides simply letting their puts expire: exercise the contractual right that
constitutes the value of a put,164 which is unaffected by a trading halt, and sell
shares at the strike price.165 To do so, however, the put holder must have shares
to sell—an unlikely position to be in for a trader looking to short an obvious
fraud.166 With shares made impossible to purchase by the halt, a trader in need
of shares to sell via exercise had to borrow them—in other words, opening a

156. Id.
157. LongFinOptions, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFinOptions/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
158. See discussion supra Part II.C.
159. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Announces Receipt of Nasdaq Non-Compliance Letter
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/04/09/1467314/0/en/Longfin-CorpAnnounces-Receipt-of-Nasdaq-Non-Compliance-Letter.html.
160. Longfin Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 9, 2018), https://sec.report/Document/000149315218-004907/.
161. Longfin Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 18, 2018), https://sec.report/Document/000149315218-005420/.
162. See LongFinOptions, supra note 157.
163. Powell, supra note 111.
164. Options Exercise, OPTIONS INDUS. COUNCIL, https://www.optionseducation.org/referencelibrary/
faq/options-exercise (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). Only about 6% of options are exercised. Id. The vast majority,
some 72%, are sold “to close.” Id. The remainder expire worthless. Id.
165. Steven Smith, If You’re Caught Holding Halted Options, THESTREET (Oct. 8, 2004, 1:49 PM),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/10186936/1/if-youre-caught-holding-halted-options.html.
166. Matt Levine, Being Short and Right Can Be Bad, BLOOMBERG: OPINION, (Apr. 20, 2018, 7:38 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-20/being-short-and-right-can-be-bad.
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traditional short position at the strike price of the put.167 Assuming the trader
was even able to obtain a borrow, which many were not,168 they were forced to
adopt the innate risks of traditional short selling,169 as well as some additional
risks that exist in short selling potentially fraudulent foreign-based companies
like Longfin. First, since obtaining shares to cover the short position was
impossible as long as the halt persisted, the trader would be on the hook for
extravagant hard-to-borrow fees until the halt lifted, the date of which was an
unknown variable at the time.170 Second, in the worst case scenario, Longfin
would cease to exist, its shares would become nigh unobtainable, and the short
position would become impossible to close; this nightmare scenario brought
down hedge fund TFS Capital after it shorted a set of fraudulent Chinese
companies.171 When the companies disappeared and their shares ceased trading
on any exchange, TFS Capital became stuck in its short positions for months,
even years, paying millions in fees to borrow shares that were long since
worthless.172 For those unwilling to bear these harrowing risks, their only hope
was that Nasdaq would lift the halt prior to expiration, or delist the company and
send it to the pink sheets to resume trading there.173
K. APRIL 20 AND MAY 18 PUTS EXPIRE
As of April 20, 2018, the halt was still in place; meanwhile, thousands of
put options expired. Nasdaq remained silent on the issue, and as affected traders
commiserated and raged,174 Nasdaq became the target of most of their ire.175
They then turned their concerns to the next expiration date, May 18th. Besides
minor developments in the SEC action against Longfin insiders,176 there was
167. Id.
168. Compare stockjunior, Exercised 10 4/20 25 Puts at TDA Today, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/
LongFinOptions/comments/8djzs5/exercised_10_420_25_puts_at_tda_today/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021)
(describing exercising puts into a short position through TD Ameritrade), with Hold_onto_yer_butts, Spoke with
Schwab, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFinOptions/comments/8dnyb5/spoke_with_schwab/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021) (describing Schwab’s refusal to lend shares of Longfin for exercise). See also shinsmax12,
Brokerage Responses, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFinOptions/comments/8av4d2/brokerage_
responses/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (discussing various brokerages’ positions on whether they will lend shares
for short positions).
169. See discussion supra Part II.F.
170. See Levine, supra note 166.
171. Bill Alpert, Getting Caught Short, BARRON’S (Apr. 6, 2018, 9:44 PM), https://www.barrons.com/
articles/getting-caught-short-1523065469.
172. Id.
173. Pink sheets refer to the market for certain over-the-counter stocks using pricing compiled by the
National Quotation Bureau. See Chris B. Murphy, Pink Sheets, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/p/pinksheets.asp (Jan. 28, 2021). Companies that trade on the pink sheets are typically penny stocks (sub$5 share price) that are highly distressed, SEC non-compliant, or outright fraudulent. See id.
174. E.g., Brother_Lancel, 4/20 Put Holders Funeral Thread, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFin
Options/comments/8dhaig/420_put_holders_funeral_thread/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
175. E.g., MarketStorm, Is NASDAQ the Crook Here?, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFinOptions/
comments/8d00jz/is_nasdaq_the_crook_here/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (postulating that Nasdaq’s continuation
of the halt was done in bad faith).
176. SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 741, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting extension of a temporary
restraining order freezing proceeds from illicit stock sales by Longfin insiders).
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little by way of news to assuage their fears that the May-expiry puts would suffer
the same fate as those that died on April 20th. Then, on May 3rd, Longfin
announced its intention to voluntarily delist from the Nasdaq exchange by filing
a Form 25 on May 14th, which would become effective ten days later on May
24th, whereupon the company would resume trading OTC.177 This was a mixed
blessing for the affected traders. Those with open short positions learned that an
end to their massive borrow fees, should they choose to cover, was nigh, and
those holding puts with expiries later than May 24th knew that the Nasdaq halt
no longer posed a threat to their position. Conversely, those holding puts set to
expire on May 18th knew for certain that unless Nasdaq lifted the halt, their only
way to capitalize on their positions remained the still-dangerous and expensive
short sale through exercise. Nasdaq remained, as before, silent on the issue.
Indeed, the halt remained until Longfin officially delisted from the Nasdaq
exchange on May 24th, having lasted a total of forty-seven days.
L. THE END: LONGFIN DELISTS AND RESUMES TRADING OTC
On May 24th, Longfin delisted and resumed trading OTC, opening at
$5.05,178 allowing shorts to cover and put holders to freely exit their positions.
Barring some minor upwards fluctuations, the stock price steadily declined,
hovering between $0.50 and $1.50 in the several months prior to this writing.179
There is little else to report about Longfin; on November 13th, the company
quietly entered an Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors, a state law alternative
to liquidation via chapter 7 bankruptcy.180

III. PROBLEMS AND LIABILITIES
A. THE PROBLEM
By refusing to lift the halt, Nasdaq deprived a significant portion of
Longfin shorts the benefit of their trades. Nasdaq failed in its duty as a regulator
by allowing Longfin to list on its exchange in the first place despite its clear
ineligibility, and failed again by allowing it to trade freely for months after its
fraudulent nature was completely apparent; by listing options that, again,
Longfin was never eligible to have; and, by trying to quietly shuffle the company
off its books with a heavy-handed regulatory halt that harmed a huge number of
retail traders that shorted the company. All the while, Nasdaq offered almost no

177. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Announces Intention to Voluntarily Delist from
NASDAQ (May 3, 2018), http://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/05/03/1496464/0/en/LongfinCorp-Announces-Intention-to-Voluntarily-Delist-from-NASDAQ.html. The delays between announcing the
intention to delist, filing Form 25, and effectuation of the Form 25 were pursuant to SEC regulations mandating
a waiting period of at least ten days between each event. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2 (2019).
178. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.
179. Id.
180. See Longfin Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1699683/000149315218016601/form8-k.htm.
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communication whatsoever as to these traders’ concerns; instead, its strategy
appears to have been to ignore the problem until it went away.
Perhaps, if there were a good reason for the halt to have stayed in place for
so long, Nasdaq’s actions would be understandable, if not commendable. No
such reason presents itself. In an official FAQ, Nasdaq claims that while it
“recognizes that a trading halt can disadvantage existing investors, Nasdaq’s
primary regulatory responsibility is to prospective investors.”181 While this
policy may seem sound at first glance, it falls apart under scrutiny. First, there
is no consistency in its application: Riot Blockchain, a company that came to
public attention under circumstances similar to Longfin’s and was also under
SEC investigation around the same time period, was never subject to a Nasdaq
regulatory halt, and remains listed on the exchange as of this writing.182 Second,
when actually applied, the policy results in absurd and undesirable outcomes—
as clearly demonstrated with Longfin. The notion that “prospective investors”
needed protection from Longfin at the time of the halt beggars belief—the
company’s many alleged failings were already widely documented and
publicized. Any market participant choosing to invest in Longfin would have
done so either with ample notice that they were gambling on an alleged fraud,
or in complete, willful ignorance. In exchange for this “protection,” Nasdaq
shifted the losses onto Longfin shorts who appeared to be entirely correct in their
criticisms of the company.
Further, Nasdaq’s interpretation of their regulatory duty is not wellsupported by the statute. The 1934 Act directs SROs like Nasdaq, “in general,
to protect investors and the public interest.”183 The Act is silent on prioritizing
prospective investors over existing investors. It does, however, direct SROs to
“promote just and equitable principles of trade” and “to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market.”184 Arbitrarily selecting
one class of investors to protect over others is hardly aligned with those edicts.
It is not just or equitable to distribute losses to traders who would profit greatly
in the absence of regulatory action in order to protect hypothetical future
investors, and halting trade on a stock and its options for a month and a half
absent a compelling reason is the exact opposite of removing impediments to a
free and open market. Nasdaq might contend that by blocking an allegedly
fraudulent company from trading on its exchange, it comports with the Act’s
directive to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.”185 While
perhaps true in an extremely narrow sense, this fails to acknowledge that Nasdaq
had already allowed Longfin to trade freely for months; the cat was very much
181. Reference Library—Advanced Search, NASDAQ, https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/ViewPDF.aspx?
Material_Search.aspx?mcd=LQ&cid=120,1,108,14,22,29,107,34,37,38,45,16,110,52,71,69&years=2016,2015,
2014,2016,2015,2014,2013,2012,2011,2010,2009,2008,2007,2006,2005,2004,2003,2002&sub_cid=&searchke
ywords=halt&exactsearchddvalue=1&Print=N&materials=0&popularfl= (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
182. Riot Blockchain, Inc. Common Stock (RIOT), NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/riot (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5).
184. Id.
185. See id.
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already out of the bag, and the halt did not “prevent” any further alleged fraud –
Nasdaq had its chance at prophylaxis in deciding whether to list Longfin and
failed.
Short sellers, particularly in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis,
are oft-vilified, and their role in the market widely misunderstood.186 The thenPresident of the New York Stock Exchange, Tom Farley, stated in 2017 that the
practice “feels kind of icky and un-American.”187 Embattled Tesla CEO and pop
culture figure Elon Musk has publicly obsessed over those shorting his company,
and while he stopped short of accusing these particular enemies of pederasty,188
derided them as “value destroyers” and contended that the practice should be
illegal.189 Short sellers, however, play an important role in maintaining efficient
markets, by investigating overvalued or even fraudulent public companies.190
They challenge inflated valuations, and because their profits depend on it, they
have an intense incentive to discover corporate failures and inefficiencies,
whereas analysts and stockholders might be content with relatively cursory due
diligence.191 Thus, short sellers serve as a defense against asset bubbles and
frauds.192 Which is not to say, of course, that individual short sellers investigate
out of the goodness of their hearts; like all other private market actors, they are
fundamentally self-interested, and thus susceptible to engaging in fraudulent or
otherwise condemnable practices. Short sellers’ legitimate interests, however,
deserve as much protection as any other market actor’s, because they are equally
as important for price discovery and the maintenance of a healthy market. Cases
like Longfin and TFS Capital demonstrate a deficiency in these protections,193
in turn depleting the incentive for short sellers to continue their investigation of
frauds that regulators fail to catch. If a prospective short seller must fear that
regulatory action might deprive them of their benefit, or worse—place them in
an intractable position that generates huge losses—they are less likely to bother
investigating in the first place, leaving the market overall more vulnerable to the
proliferation of fraud and overvaluation. Some view short sellers as the scumsucking bottom feeders of the market—and perhaps there is some validity to that

186. See generally Scott Squires, Going Long on Shorts, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 821, 832 (2014) (arguing that
short selling is often incorrectly maligned).
187. Annie Massa, NYSE President Calls Short Sellers ‘Icky’, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2017, 1:58 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-27/short-sellers-icky-to-nyse-chief-seeking-betterdisclosure.
188. Musk recently stirred controversy when he repeatedly accused an integral member of a cave rescue
operation in Thailand of being a pedophile and a rapist after the caver criticized Musk’s efforts to join in the
effort. See Ryan Mac, Mark Di Stefano & John Paczkowski, In a New Email, Elon Musk Accused a Cave Rescuer
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comparison—but bottom feeders, ugly as they may be, are a vital part of any
ecosystem.194
B. LITIGATION PROVIDES LITTLE RECOURSE
Traders affected by the halt were unsurprisingly eager to sue, with the most
obvious and popular target being Nasdaq itself.195 As already discussed,196 any
cause of action brought against Nasdaq faces insurmountable hurdles. Given that
“there are few functions more quintessentially regulatory than suspension of
trading,”197 there is really no question that Nasdaq is entitled to quasigovernmental absolute immunity against actions brought by harmed Longfin
shorts. As for suing Longfin and its affiliates, even if an action against them is
sustainable, the prospects of recovering tens of millions from foreign-based
frauds with essentially no domestic assets are dire. There is a substantial
likelihood that Longfin and its orchestrators are judgement proof. Additionally,
even if there are viable causes of action stemming from Nasdaq’s actions, costly
and protracted litigation is a poor remedy for an issue that is easily preventable.
This Note will not argue for change in SRO liability. As long as the SRO
system persists, and there is little reason to think it will not, the reasoning behind
affording SROs absolute immunity for regulatory actions remains sound—
regulators in fear of liability are less likely to take any action whatsoever.198
While the system is ripe for criticism,199 rethinking it entirely is well beyond the
bounds of this Note, and is simply unnecessary to repair the narrow issue
presented in the case of Longfin.

IV. RETHINKING REGULATORY HALTS
A. TRANSPARENCY
Putting aside changes that would have prevented the unnecessary losses
stemming from the halt, the first problematic throughline to address is the
remarkable lack of transparency displayed by Nasdaq throughout the story.
Besides the T12 code used to describe the type of halt being implemented,
Nasdaq’s only other mass communication with concerned traders consisted of a
press release issued concurrently with the halt stating that “[t]rading will remain
halted until Longfin Corp. has fully satisfied Nasdaq’s request for additional
194. See John R. Platt, Can’t an Ugly, Slimy Bottom-Feeder Get Some Love?, SCI. AM.: EXTINCTION
COUNTDOWN (Aug. 5, 2011), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/can-8217-t-an-uglyslimy-bottom-feeder-get-some-love/ (explaining the ecological importance of the bottom-feeding hagfish,
which, coincidentally, the author describes as “icky”).
195. See, e.g., Ididthemaths0, Any Possibility of a Class Action Suit for Put Holders?, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFinOptions/comments/8bqgnd/any_possibility_of_a_class_action_suit_for_put/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (discussing possible causes of action against Nasdaq).
196. See discussion supra Part II.B.
197. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1214 (1998).
198. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 101 (2007) (noting that absolute immunity allows
regulators to perform their functions without the distraction of constant litigation).
199. E.g., Hammond, supra note 15.
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information.”200 Traders who called in directly reported that Nasdaq refused to
comment on Longfin specifically and gave only generalized answers about
trading halts and the delisting process.201 Nasdaq never explained what
information they were purportedly seeking, or how its request could be “fully
satisfied” so as to trigger resumption of trading. Not only was this paucity of
information unhelpful, it was actively misleading—the press release suggested
that Longfin might resume trading when really, Nasdaq likely never intended to
lift the halt regardless of what information Longfin provided. This last point is
and will remain speculative—Nasdaq has not disclosed any further explanation
for their decision to keep the halt in place; nor do they have a history of doing
so.
Greater transparency from Nasdaq and similarly situated SROs would be
almost purely beneficial to the integrity of the market as a whole. Transparency
will not only allow market participants to be better informed in their decisionmaking, it will inspire greater confidence in the market overall, particularly from
the perspective of retail traders who lack the insider lines of communication
possessed by large financial institutions. Nasdaq might argue that issuers are
entitled to confidentiality in the proceedings surrounding a halt, but this fails to
convince. From a purely legalistic perspective, there is simply no justification
for this attitude in plain language of the relevant statutes. Further, it would be
plainly contrary to the pro-disclosure principles that are the foundation of
modern securities regulation. Affording confidentiality to issuers who are noncompliant with that regime in the first instance cuts directly against those
principles of transparency. Additionally, the argument fails to justify Nasdaq’s
lack of transparency after the fact. Even accepting arguendo that in-the-moment
confidentiality is appropriate, Nasdaq’s near-total silence as to its internal
proceedings regarding Longfin even after the stock was delisted is totally
inconsistent with the aims of the securities laws.
This Note will not propose specific formulations for a new transparency
regime; assuming they can be trusted to act in the public interest, the SROs
themselves, being familiar with aspects of their regulatory operations that
currently take place behind closed doors, are best situated to address the problem
in conjunction with SEC oversight. Further, the aim of this Note is not to propose
a solution to Nasdaq’s reticence; rather, it seeks a change that will prevent
scenarios such as that presented by the Longfin halt from ever happening again.
B. RETHINKING SRO POWER TO HALT
As demonstrated by the story of Longfin, regulatory halts can have
devastating effects, making otherwise profitable trades into total losses. In
discussing the use of regulatory halts by the SEC, the Supreme Court stated that
“the power to summarily suspend trading in a security even for 10 days, without
200. Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Halts Longfin Corp. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://business.nasdaq.com/
mediacenter/pressreleases/1717402/nasdaq-halts-longfin-corp.
201. See, e.g., bronsonm1990, Nasdaq Call Info, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/LongFinOptions/
comments/8bhq0v/nasdaq_call_info/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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any notice, opportunity to be heard, or findings based upon a record, is an
awesome power with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its
shareholders, and other investors.”202 With this almost reverential respect for the
power of regulatory halts in mind, it seems incongruous that exchanges can not
only emplace their own halts, but can do so indefinitely, with no or minimal
outside scrutiny, and without any mechanism by which traders and investors can
overcome them.
With respect to Longfin, it is this power to halt indefinitely that is
ultimately responsible for the unjustified losses of short sellers. This is
fundamentally a problem of timing: options, because of their expiration dates,
and to a lesser extent traditional short sales (because of borrow fees), are
extremely time-sensitive.203 Nasdaq, by halting Longfin for forty-seven straight
days, locked a huge amount of traders into these time-sensitive positions with
no meaningful opportunity to close them, much less profit from them. Fixing
this problem does not require completely stripping the power of exchanges to
issue regulatory halts, nor is such a change justified. There are perfectly
legitimate reasons for an exchange to issue a trading halt; namely, to gather and
disseminate developing information so that market participants can make
informed trading decisions—exactly what Nasdaq purported to, but did not do
here. By using its T12 halt code, Nasdaq’s official position was that it was
seeking additional information from Longfin, yet it never disclosed any
information that was not already publicly available. Instead, it appears that
Nasdaq, embarrassed at having allowed such an obvious fraud to list, simply
wanted the company to stop trading on its exchange as quickly as possible and
used a regulatory halt to accomplish that end. Admittedly, this is conjecture, but
even without imputing this untoward motive to Nasdaq, the action itself is
simply contrary to the general notion of “free and open markets.”204
To fix this problem, the 1934 Act should be amended to place a limit on
the number of consecutive days exchanges like Nasdaq can maintain a
regulatory halt. This change is consistent with limits on SEC regulatory halts,
which can only last up to ten business days without notice and opportunity for
hearing.205 There are no compelling reasons to avoid applying similar restraint
to self-regulating exchanges. Perhaps the technological limitations that existed
in 1934 justified giving the exchanges this unfettered power—gathering and
disseminating information in that time period was prodigiously difficult and
time consuming when compared to the ease of information transfer today. The
advent of the internet, however, made such endeavors trivial, and that reasoning
largely uncompelling. Further, placing a limit on halt duration will encourage
the exchanges to be swift in their enforcement efforts, and more diligent in
regulating what they let list in the first place.

202.
203.
204.
205.

SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 112 (1978).
See discussion supra Part III.F.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2018).
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A five business day limit on exchange-issued regulatory halts, akin to the
limit that already exists on SEC halts, would have prevented the unjustified
losses of Longfin short sellers. The potential for harm inflicted by indefinite
halts vastly outweighs whatever meager benefits they provide, and such a change
is in line with the duty levied on SROs—to encourage the development of a free
and open market.206

CONCLUSION
Beneath the humorous veneer provided by Venkat Meenavalli and his
antics, Longfin tells a rather sinister story. A story of persistent, repeated failure
by regulators and large institutions to adequately perform their duties: Nasdaq,
by allowing Longfin to list in the first place despite apparently being
demonstrably fraudulent from the jump, by allowing Longfin options to trade
when they never should have, and by ham-fistedly halting the stock out of
apparent embarrassment; FTSE Russell, by indexing and in turn legitimizing
what appeared to be an obvious fraud that clearly did not meet their own
requirements; and asset managers like BlackRock, who blindly trusted FTSE
and irresponsibly pumped a stock they had no business buying. All the while, as
these major players continually fumbled their handling of the company, it fell to
amateur retail traders to do the regulators’ job. Which they did, and
commendably so—only to be left holding the bag, cheated out of the benefit of
their diligence, when Nasdaq arbitrarily decided to halt the stock for forty-seven
days. While the story of Longfin highlights a host of glaring problems with the
SRO system, it only provides a clear answer to one: the almost unfettered power
of self-regulated exchanges to wield the “awesome power” of indefinite trading
halts. Fortunately, this problem is easily addressed by simply placing a limit on
the duration of these halts. Short sellers are often the subject of derision in the
public consciousness, which is unfortunate, because they serve a vitally
important role in maintaining a healthy market and preventing bubbles. In
addition to simply being more aligned with the general principle of free and open
markets, the changes recommended in this Note would protect short sellers’
legitimate interests and preserve the incentive for them to do their jobs without
any meaningful side effects.

206. See id. § 78f(b)(5).

